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This study traces the development of the recently adopted packaging waste 
directive in order to illuminate the role of various actors in the integration 
process. While some of the findings about agenda-setting and qualified 
majority voting presented in this study apply directly to the sector of 
environmental policy, or specifically to the chosen case, the broader 
conclusions suggest the need for additional case studies of EC legislation and 
offer a theoretical framework in which these studies may be used to test 
competing notions of European integration. To this end, the study uses lessons 
from the case of packaging waste to refine the ongoing debate between 
scholars who propose state-centric models and those who advocate a view of 
Europe in which power is diffused to supranational institutions at the expense 
of state sovereignty.





























































































After nearly three years of protracted negotiations between the 
institutions of the European Community, the Council of Ministers formally 
adopted Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste in December 
1994 (OJL365 31.12.94). This study traces the development of the directive 
in order to illuminate the role of various actors in shaping EC environmental 
policy. As the first major example of EC environmental policymaking under 
the Maastricht Treaty, and having become the most heavily lobbied dossier in 
the history of the European institutions the packaging directive provides the 
perfect vehicle through which to assess a number of larger questions 
surrounding European integration.
The directive exemplifies the conflict between the Community’s attempt 
to achieve free trade amongst member states and its central environmental 
policy objectives—preventing pollution at the source and achieving sustainable 
development. As such, one would expect that the lessons learned from the 
development of the packaging directive would be applicable to the study of a 
wide range of other Community actions in the field of environmental 
protection.
More importantly, however, insight into the actual interplay between the 
Council, Commission, European Parliament allows tentative conclusions to be 
drawn about the character of the integration process: the ability of the 
Commission to set and retain control of the agenda, the impact of the 
European Parliament on the content of directives, and the extent to which 
qualified majority voting produces Council decisions which are at a level 
above the lowest-common denominator. Ultimately, by tracing the directive 
through its many versions, assessing the role of various actors and thereby 
identifying "winners" and "losers", this study seeks to contribute to the larger 
debate about whether EC integration strengthens the state, or rather empowers 





























































































The question inevitably arises as to how generalisable are conclusions 
based on a single case study and how representative is the chosen study of 
overall Community policymaking. No claim is made here that an analysis of 
the packaging waste directive captures all types of decisionmaking within the 
Community, nor that all Community legislation develops in a similar manner. 
Instead, it is suggested that the packaging waste example raises a number of 
important questions about state power and institutional influence which are 
germane to the large segment of EC decisionmaking which involves positive 
integration and the harmonisation of diverging national regulations. While 
some of the findings presented in this study apply directly to the chosen case, 
the broader conclusions suggest the need for additional case studies of EC 
legislation and offer a theoretical framework in which these studies may be 
used to test competing notions of European integration.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section traces the development 
of the packaging directive throughout the entire policymaking cycle—pre-draft 
stage, official Commission proposal, first reading in the European Parliament, 
common position in the Council, second reading in the European Parliament, 
adoption by Council. A primary aim of the first section is to identify the key 
legislative objectives of the Commission and Parliament, as well as to provide 
a picture of the current and projected recycling plans of the member states.
The second section examines in more detail the role of each institutional 
actor. Evidence of how the packaging directive actually developed is used to 
test a variety of predictions about the role of each institution in the 
decisionmaking procedure which stem from the available theoretical and 
empirical literature. This section uses experience from the case of packaging 
to test notions of agenda-setting, parliamentary influence, and intra-Council 
bargaining.
The third section uses the packaging case to address broader questions of 




























































































who propose state-centric models and those who advocate a view of Europe in 
which power is diffused at the expense of state sovereignty. This section 
draws heavily on two recent analyses by Andrew Moravcsik and Gary Marks 
which have come to frame the debate between these two competing concepts of 
European integration (Moravcsik 1994, Marks 1994). The case study of the 
packaging directive reveals that this debate has a tendency to proceed along 
effectively unrelated paths, with state centrist models focusing on the issue of 
power while diffusion theorists concentrate instead on the issue of influence. 
It is suggested that a clearer distinction between these two issues demonstrates 
the strengths as well as the shortcomings of each theory, and provides a useful 
analytical framework in which to place future empirical studies.
2. The Problem Of Packaging Waste In The EC
Disposing of the nearly 50 million tonnes of packaging waste produced 
each year and the "waste mountains" which already exist throughout the 
Community presents member states with serious environmental and economic 
problems. Some member states have introduced voluntary or compulsory 
agreements with industry to reduce the production of packaging waste,
, encourage its reuse or recycling. The most ambitious programmes have been 
implemented by Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Before reuse or 
recycling can occur however, packaging waste must be "recovered", which 
entails collecting and sorting various materials from the general waste stream. 
In some cases states require the recovery of most, if not all packaging waste. 
This presents a number of disposal problems. Burning or burying such 
enormous quantities of waste places human health at risk. Recycling of waste 
may prevent damage to the environment and to health but only after a 
substantial investment in appropriate technology. Faced with the costs of 




























































































some states pay to incinerate, landfill or recycle their used packaging in other 
EC countries.
Swamped with what are effectively subsidised waste imports, and thus 
unable to dispose effectively of their own packaging, several member states 
began conisering plans to restrict landfill, incineration and recycling to 
domestic waste only (House of Lords 1993). While this might solve the 
problems of a few states, it would of course result in even higher waste 
mountains in countries which relied on exporting used packaging.
Equally important, restrictions on waste imports raised serious questions 
about the free movement of goods throughout the Community. Although the 
ECJ has upheld the right of an individual country under Article 36 to enact 
environmental laws more stringent than those found in other member states, 
such exceptions to Article 30 are allowed only under certain circumstances— 
the national measures must be necessary to improve protection of the 
environment, and they must not discriminate between foreign and domestic 
producers.2 Although its most recent ruling on the matter contains 
contradictory statements about how to balance environmental protection and 
free movement of goods, the Court appeared willing to allow bans on specific 
waste imports destined for landfill (von Wilmowsky 1993).
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to believe that the Court would 
not allow similar specific bans, let alone general bans, of transnational waste 
shipments destined for recycling. First, contrary to the Treaty, such bans 
necessitate a clear discrimination between domestic and foreign producers. 
Even Ludwig Kramer, an EC lawyer sympathetic to unilateral national 
environmental actions, agrees that "any import restriction on waste constitutes
2A full review of the case law relating to Article 30 and Article 36 has been made elsewhere, 
and is not necessary for the present discussion. See Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark 
[1988] ECR 4607; Case 2/90, Commission v. Belgium [1992]; Sexton (1991), Kramer 




























































































an arbitrary discrimination and is therefore incompatible with Article 30" 
(Kramer 1993:128-9).
Second, unlike bottle recycling laws or regulations obliging the use of 
biodegradable plastic bags, bans on waste destined for recycling do nothing to 
improve the overall quality of the environment, as pollution is merely 
relocated rather than reduced. The Court has often held that it makes no 
difference from an ecological point of view which state disposes of waste, as 
long as disposal occurs. In sum, the existing case law suggests that the ECJ 
would not tolerate national bans on imported packaging waste because they 
constitute unjustified barriers to trade (von Wilmowsky 1993:558). In other 
words, Community law did not require states to develop self-sufficient means 
of recycling their packaging waste but could instead make use of recycling 
facilities in neighbouring states.
In order to avert protracted legal proceedings over the legitimacy of 
"green protectionism" and to reduce the environmental threats from excessive 
packaging waste in the Community, the Commission began considering 
various preventive and harmonising measures. The Commission's efforts 
culminated in its proposal on packaging and packaging waste in July 1992, 
which was made under Article 100A of the Treaty. 3
3. The Policymaking Cycle
From Pre-draft to Draft: the Commission Abandons its Bold Objectives
The driving force behind the proposal was to prevent "green 
protectionism" from destroying the free movement of packaging waste within 
the Community without also preventing member states from finding ways to 
deal effectively with their own waste. These two objectives are not easily 
reconciled—one way of dealing with national waste is to export it to 
neighbouring states for disposal, often at heavily subsidised rates, a practice 




























































































problems of packaging waste. Hence the rise of protectionism to keep out 
enormous subsidised waste shipments, particularly from those arising from the 
German Duales System Deutschland (DSD) scheme which was introduced in 
1991 by environment minister Klaus Topfer.3
In order to maintain free movement of goods without condemning some 
states to act as disposal havens and to suffer burgeoning waste mountains, and 
in line with its emphasis on preventing environmental damage at the source, 
the Commission originally sought to introduce three major elements into its 
proposal:3 4
1) Freezing the Community's output of waste at current levels by 
setting a per capita maximum of 150 kg/yr of packaging waste, to 
be achieved within ten years.
2) Targets: A mandatory minimum "recovery" rate of 60% (by 
weight) for all packaging waste within five years, rising to 90% 
after ten years.5 A mandatory minimum recycling rate of 40%
(by weight) for each type of packaging material within five years; 
rising to 60% after ten years.6 Minimisation of the final disposal 
of packaging waste (i.e.-by landfill or incineration without energy 
recovery) to no more than 10% by weight of packaging waste 
output after ten years. Thus, after ten years, 60% of packaging 
waste would have to be recycled, 30% could be recovered but not 
recycled, and no more than 10% could be disposed of through 
rubbish tips or incineration without energy recovery.
3) Hierarchy of Disposal Options: The Commission originally 
wanted to encourage what it considered to be the most ecologically 
rational disposal methods by including within the proposal a 
hierarchy of goals: prevention, re-use, recycling, incineration 
with energy recovery, incineration without energy recovery, 
landfill.
3See Financial Times, 6 December 1991; Economist, 29 May 1993; House of Lords (1993); 
Agence Europe, 56  July 1993.
4These elements featured in the seven pre-draft versions of the proposal which were under 
negotiation within the Commission since 1990.
5Recovery includes, among other things listed in Annex IIB of the framework directive 
75/442 on waste: re-use, recycling, composting, regeneration, and recovery of energy.




























































































As originally conceived, the Commission's targets exceeded the existing 
plans of many EC countries and were modelled to a large extent on the 
ambitious national recycling achievements and goals of Germany and the 
Netherlands. The following two tables show recycling rates within the 
Community for each type of packaging material and the commitment of each 
member state to increase recovery and recycling in the coming years.7 
Calculation of plastic recycling rates is particularly problematic and is 
discussed in greater detail later in this paper.
Table 1 National Recycling Rates






Germany 40 31 65
Denmark 35 31 64
Netherlands 50 47 76
Belgium 36(1988) 4(1987) 55
France 43 25 46
UK 31 19 29
Luxembourg NA NA NA
Italy 25 36 52
Spain 51 28 29
Greece 21 25 (1990) ~n
Portugal 39 4 1 9 -
Ireland 3 NA 29
7Source: compiled from European Environment, 28 July 1992; Newman and Foster (1993); 




























































































Table 2 Commission Proposal Compared with National Plans
Recovery Targets Recycling Targets
C o m m is s io n
P r o p o s a l
2 0 0 0 : 60%  o f  a ll m a te r ia ls  
2 0 0 5 :  90 %  o f  a ll m a te r ia ls
2 0 0 0 : 46 %  o f  e a c h  m a te r ia l  
2 0 0 5 :  60 %  o f  e a ch  m a te r ia l
Germany 1995: 80% of each material 1995: 64-72% of each material
Denmark NA 2000: 50% of each material




2000: 58% of all materials 
2000: 60-80% of all materials
1998: 70-80% of each material
France 2002: 75% of all materials 2000: 75% of glass
UK 2000: 50-75% of all material
Luxembourg 1995: 95% of liquid food containers 1994: 78% of liquid food containers






For most member states the original Commission proposal would have 
entailed a serious reconsideration of strategies aimed at reducing and 
recovering certain types of packaging waste. In a few cases it might also have 
involved additional investment in recycling technology. For the less 
developed and southern states the Commission proposal would have required a 
complete overhaul of their waste management programs, forcing the 
introduction of set recycling targets and implementation deadlines, each of 
which were practically unheard of or limited to individual types of waste such 
as drink containers.
The Commission immediately came under pressure from the member 
states and from industrial groups to make the proposal more flexible. Some 
states, mainly Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands wanted either higher 
Community targets or flexibility which guaranteed that the directive would 
not prevent them from adopting more stringent standards of their own. Other 
states worried that the targets were already too high and impossible to meet. 




























































































Manufacturers of Europe, the European Organisation for Packaging and the 
Environment, the European Recovery and Recycling Association, the Alliance 
for Beverage Cartons, along with several other large European peak 
organisations for packaging and recycling feared that overly-ambitious 
recovery and recycling targets failed to take account of the market for these 
products.8
In response to this pressure the Commission abandoned many of its 
original goals by the time it released the first official draft.9 Gone were the 
per capita waste provision, the binding intermediary five year targets and the 
hierarchy of disposal methods. What remained was a 90 percent recovery 
target and a 60 percent recycling target over ten years, with states required to 
predict when they would meet the intermediary targets.
The European Parliament's First Reading
Under the terms of the co-decision procedure the European Parliament 
(EP) has two opportunities to amend the packaging proposal. Each "reading" 
is actually a two-part process: first, the Environment Committee of the EP 
issues a report suggesting amendments; second, this report is adopted in part 
or in full by the rest of the EP.
In its report, the Environment Committee put forward 79 amendments. 
True to its reputation as a source of zealous environmental concern, it 
proceeded to reintroduce most of the provisions originally favoured by the 
Commission, including the hierarchy of disposal methods and the binding five 
year recovery and recycling targets. The Committee also sought to guarantee 
the rights of individual member states to opt-up for more stringent domestic 
standards, balancing admonitions against distorting the market with language
industry  and trade representatives set up two highly successful pressure groups: the 
packaged consumer goods industries coordination group, and the packaging legislation ad hoc 
group. See Club de Bruxelles (1994).
9OJ C263 12.10.92. See Europe Environment, 4 February 1992, 28 July 1992 and 1 




























































































clearly designed to allow ambitious national economic instruments such and 
waste exports (European Parliament 1993).10 These amendments suggested 
that because no exact had been given of what constituted a high level of 
environmental protection, member states could take "more rigorous" 
unilateral measures as long as the goal was to protect the environment. The 
Environment Committee also sought to require mandatory minimum 
proportions of recycled material in packaging, to eliminate in ten years all 
packaging containing certain heavy metals, and to take account of the special 
conditions affecting islands.11 This latter concern, although extremely 
ambiguous, was the first sign that the EC might consider derogations for some 
regions.
On 23 June 1993 the EP accepted most of the Environment Committee's 
major recommendations, retaining the hierarchy, the intermediary standards, 
the minimum content of recycled materials in packaging, the sensitivity to the 
needs of islands. However, while the EP expanded the scope of unilateral 
national action slightly by accepting the amendments allowing national 
economic instruments which pursued environmental goals, it rejected all three 
amendments aimed at allowing broad national opt-ups. It also rejected the 
mandatory ban on packaging containing heavy metals.12
Round Two
Still wanting to maximise the green provisions of the directive but 
aware of the Council's concerns about flexibility and having received the 
results of the EP's first reading, the Commission produced an amended 
proposal on 9 September 1993 which reintroduced the binding five year
10See amendments No. 10, 53, 60, 66, and 70, none of which envisage the strict regime of 
national recycling self-sufficiency which was later adopted by the Council.
"S ee  amendments No. 9, 17, 28, 37, 42, 66, 76.




























































































targets and took account of islands.13 However, the amended proposal rejected 
both minimum levels of recycled material in packaging and a total phase-out 
of packaging containing heavy metals, and abandoned any mention of a 
hierarchy for disposal methods. Just as the Parliament had done, the 
Commission rejected all of the amendments which would have explicitly 
allowed widespread national opt-ups, but nevertheless adopted provisions 
which allowed some autonomous national deviation through the use of 
environmentally minded economic instruments. The balance between uniform 
EC standards geared towards free movement of goods, and more stringent 
national action based on environmental considerations was thus left somewhat 
unresolved.
Within the Council two coalitions were emerging. The UK, the less 
developed member states—Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal—and to a lesser 
extent France and Italy favoured a lower recovery target and the omission of 
binding recycling targets for each type of material. Taking the initiative for 
this group, the UK proposed dropping any mention of recycling but retaining 
a goal of 50 percent recovery within ten years. Not surprisingly, this 
proposal coincided exactly with existing UK plans.14
In the event, the opposing coalition of Germany, Denmark and the 
Benelux states lost the qualified majority vote and the Council adopted a 
common position which included flexible and less demanding five year targets: 
50-65 percent recovery, an overall packaging waste recycling rate of 25-45 
percent, a minimum recycling rate of 15 percent for each type of material.15 
Binding ten year targets were dropped entirely. Instead of limiting special 
considerations merely to islands, the less developed countries were granted 
derogations giving them ten years to meet these targets. The common position
13OJ C194 19.7.93.
14Europe Environment, 28 September 1993 and 12 October 1993; Agence Europe, 6 
October 1993 and 1992.
15Agence Europe, 3 December 1993 and 17 December 1993; Europe Environment, 9 




























































































retained only very limited grounds upon which nations could opt-up for 
higher targets. States exercising this option were not allowed to cause market 
distortion and were required to possess sufficient domestic recycling capacity. 
In essence, the common position foreclosed the possibility of enormous 
packaging waste exports arising from Germany and other states with 
extremely ambitious domestic recycling standards.
The European Parliament's Second Reading
Faced with a common position which had been considerably weakened 
from an environmental standpoint, the European Parliament tried again 
during its second reading to reintroduce some of the provisions originally 
favoured by the Commission and a few which it had put forward in its first 
reading. However, the scale and ambition of the Environment Committee's 
second reading was a token gesture compared to its earlier efforts, consisting 
of only 38 amendments (European Parliament 1994a). The Environment 
Committee voted on 7 April 1994 to remove any restrictions on maximum 
targets and decided to nearly double the requirements for specific materials 
from 15% to 25%. It also reintroduced the hierarchy of disposal methods 
which the Council had rejected and reinserted requirements for a minimum 
level of recycled material in packaging. On 4 May, however, each of these 
proposed amendments failed to gain sufficient support in the European 
Parliament, leaving the Council's common position virtually unchanged.16
Having survived two readings by the European Parliament, all that 
remained between the proposal and its adoption was a vote in Council. Before 
this could occur, however, an unforeseen obstacle appeared in the form of 
Belgian dissatisfaction with the wording of the proposal, fearing that it would 
jeopardise its national ecotax. A Belgian defection would have proved fatal to 
the proposal by depriving it of the necessary 54 votes which represented a




























































































qualified majority vote (QMV). The problem was compounded when 
Luxembourg threatened to resist the proposal for similar reasons. To make 
any changes to the proposal at this point would mean altering the text which 
the Council had received back from the Parliament after its second reading. 
But some change was necessary to resolve the deadlock, so the proposal passed 
into the conciliation procedure as provided for in the Treaty. An equal 
number of MEPs and members of the Council met to hammer out a 
compromise. Belgium was eventually satisfied with a revised wording of the 
section on economic instruments designed to reach the recycling targets. 
Britain, which had also threatened to defect, was equally satisfied that the 
proposal would not allow national economic instruments which distorted the 
market, nor would it herald the future wide-spread imposition of Community 
ecotaxes on member states (Agence Europe, 9 June 1994, 10 June 1994).
During the three conciliation meetings which were held between July 
and November 1994, representatives from the Parliament, supported by the 
minority coalition in the Council, tried unsuccessfully to reopen debate on 
various amendments which were defeated during the second reading.17 
Putting on a brave face and overlooking the complete failure of the EP to 
secure many of its specific environmental objectives, Ken Collins declared that 
"Parliament has won everything on packaging waste" (Agence Europe, 10 
November 1994). Perhaps more revealingly, Greenpeace was furious with the 
directive and the European Greens called the result "a bad directive" 
engineered by the industrial lobby which posed "a threat to the environment" 
(Agence Europe, 14/15 November 1994).
The saga of the packaging waste proposal came to an end on 20 
December 1994 when Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands lost a qualified 
majority vote in Council. 'Hie directive which was adopted contained all the
17Europe Environment, 14 June 1994 and 12 July 1994 and 25 October 1994 and 22 




























































































major features found in the common position, along with the vague section on 
national economic instruments and a commitment to revisit the entire issue of 
waste again in ten years with a view to substantially increased recycling 
targets. The following table chronicles the development of the directive 
through each phase of the decisionmaking process, noting the introduction and 
demise of various key provisions.
Table 3 Development of the Directive
Comml Comm2 EPEC1 EPl Comm3 Position EPEC2 EP2 Adopted
Per Capita Limits Yes No No No No No No No No
Minimum Use of 
Recycled Materials No No Yes Yes No No Yes No No


















Islands Yes Yes Yes Yes
Five Year Targets
-total recovery rate 60% No 60% 60% 60% 50-65% 50% 50-65% 50-65%
-total recycling rate 
—recycling rate for
25-45% 25% 25-45% 25-45%
each type of material 40% No 40% 40% 40% 15% 25% 15% 15%
Ten Year Targets 
-total recovery rate 
—recycling rate for
90% 90% 90% 90% 90% No No No No
each type of material 
—maximum landfill
60% 60% 60% 60% 60% No No No No
and burning 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% No No No No
-heavy metals ban No No Yes No No No No No No
Note: Comm 1 =Commission pre-draft objectives 
Comm2=Commission first draft
EPECl=First report by the Environment Committee of the European Parliament 
EPl=First reading by the European Parliament 
Comm3=Revised Commission proposal
EPEC2=Second report by the Environment Committee of the European Parliament 
EP2=Second reading by die European Parliament
4. Institutional Roles
Commission as Agenda Setter and Policy Entrepreneur
As the formal initiator of all legislative proposals within the EC, the 
Commission's power stems from its ability to set the agenda (Wallace, Wallace 




























































































Blank 1994). If in fact that power is more than illusory, one would expect to 
find that the Commission exercised considerable control over the shape of the 
packaging waste directive, with a clear resemblance between the Commission's 
pre-draft objectives and the provisions found in the eventual agreement. 
Alternatively, development of the directive might illustrate the relative 
impotence or irrelevance of the Commission's agenda setting powers. In this 
case there would be little or no relation between the Commission's predraft 
plans and the content of the directive after it had survived protracted 
negotiation between EC institutions and undergone successive rounds of 
amendment.
The case of the waste packaging directive reveals the ability of the 
Commission formally to set the agenda and the ability of Parliament to affect 
the pace and content of EC legislation. Stringent recovery and recycling 
standards, five year targets, per capita waste limits and a hierarchy of disposal 
methods may have been the product of extensive consultation with a variety of 
interests, including NGOs and technical experts from each member state, but 
these provisions could only be put on the formal agenda if the Commission 
included them in the draft directive.
For many observers of European integration, agenda setting is 
synonymous with controlling the shape of first drafts. It is not difficult to 
find evidence supporting this conception of agenda setting—the Commission's 
right of initiative, its direct dialogue with a plethora of actors, its extensive 
network of technical experts and its role as policy entrepreneur yield 
considerable control over the timing and content of legislative proposals, 
including the one on packaging waste. However, this study clearly shows the 
need for a more demanding conception of agenda setting. Despite the obvious 
window of opportunity for a packaging waste directive, the Commission failed 
to secure most of its original primary objectives. The per capita waste target 




























































































draft appeared, the recovery and recycling targets were substantially reduced 
in order to meet the demands of the member states. That the targets were 
effectively reduced to the lowest common denominator is discussed further 
below.
Even if one assumes a certain amount of gamesmanship, whereby the 
Commission habitually puts forward extremely ambitious proposals and 
targets which it knows will be sacrificed during subsequent negotiations with 
the Council, the weakness of the Commission as an agenda-setter is striking. 
Although from Table 3 the change in specific targets from the pre-draft 
objectives to the final adoption, consisting of a few percentage points, might 
appear insignificant and thus a clear case of Commission agenda-setting, it was 
precisely these few points upon which the possibility of expensive state 
obligations turned. As noted in more detail below, the provisions in the final 
version of the directive do not reflect a compromise situated in the middle- 
ground between Commission and Council objectives. Rather, the directive 
represented the least common denominator because the Commission was 
forced to capitulate to a qualified majority in the Council.
Influence of the European Parliament
The 1987 Single European Act significantly increased the powers of the 
EP. The previous requirement that the Council merely seek the opinion of 
Parliament before adopting legislation gave way to the co-operation 
procedure, whereby directives face the very real possibility of amendment or 
rejection during two readings by the EP. Evidence since 1987 suggests that 
the co-operation procedure, with provided the Parliament with two readings 
of many proposals, did indeed bestow significant new powers on the EP and 
elevate its role from that of a hapless spectator to an important partner in the 
EC policymaking dialogue, often working in conjunction with the Commission 




























































































decision procedure the EP enjoys even greater power to introduce substantial 
amendments to or outrightly block the Council's common position.
This has been particularly apparent in the field of EC environmental 
policy where the EP has altered or rejected a significant number of major 
directives (Arp 1992, Eamshaw and Judge 1993, Judge and Eamshaw 1994). 
Much of the EP's success has been due to the ideological devotion and tireless 
efforts of Ken Collins and the other members of its Environment Committee 
(Judge 1993). Based on past experience one would expect to see the European 
Parliament strive to "green" the packaging waste directive during its two 
readings of the proposal. It would also not be surprising to find that the 
Parliament worked with the Commission to maintain or strengthen the 
environmental focus of the proposal.
In this respect, two lessons emerge from the saga of the packaging 
waste directive. First, that the "greening" effect of the Parliament does not 
necessarily occur. As this study reveals, this is explained by distinguishing 
between the efforts of the Environment Committee and those of the 
Parliament itself. Under the leadership of Ken Collins, the Environment 
Committee acted predictably during both its readings and reintroduced the 
stringent environmental standards originally proposed by the Commission. 
But the Parliament did not always follow the advice of its Environment 
Committee. Amendments supported by the Committee, aimed at eliminating 
limits on maximum recycling rates, establishing a hierarchy of disposal 
methods, allowing considerable room for national opt-ups, requiring a 
minimum amount of recycled material in packaging, and banning heavy metals 
in packaging were all defeated during either the first or second reading.
Second, and perhaps more significant, the formal powers of the 
Parliament to shape EC policy were clear—for some amendments the 




























































































reading.18 It is impossible to construct a perfect counterfactual scenario based 
on what might have happened if these 22 votes had been forthcoming. 
However, two possibilities deserve consideration. The qualified majority 
coalition could have accepted the amendments, in which case Denmark, 
Germany and the Netherlands would have been free to achieve high recovery 
and recycling standards despite the effects which this would have had on 
neighbouring states. In addition, the hierarchy would have made it politically 
more difficult for states to avoid prevention as a primary objective, and also 
more difficult for them to pursue less desirable forms of waste disposal, 
particularly composting and incineration. Alternatively, an undivided 
Parliament could have blocked Council action by replacing the common 
position with an unpopular alternative. If either of these situations had 
occurred it would have demonstrated the very real agenda-setting power of 
the Parliament.
Taking these two lessons together, the study demonstrates the limits of 
partnership between the Parliament and Commission. Needing to muster only 
a quality majority vote in the Council under the terms of the SEA, one would 
predict that by working together—in essence, pooling their formal powers—the 
Commission and the increasingly powerful EP would achieve a number of 
their objectives and dictate the shape of EC policy.
As the case of the packaging directive makes clear, the interests of the 
Commission and the Parliament do not always coincide. During its first 
reading, the Environment Committee and the Parliament as a whole 
reintroduced provisions which the Commission had abandoned in order to 
gain Council support. Commission encouragement was also noticeably absent 
during the second reading, which left the Environment Committee, already
18This was due to the differing positions of the parties in the European Parliament. Most EP 
Socialists followed the lead of the Environment Committee. The Greens hated the watered 
down proposal and put forward a substitute. They might have supported the Environment 
Committee but preferred no action to bad action. The EPP and the RDE resisted any move 




























































































lacking sufficient support in Parliament, alone to press for these amendments. 
During both readings the Commission also refused to adopt amendments 
favoured by the Environment Committee or the Parliament which would have 
strengthened the environmental profile of the directive, including minimum 
amounts of recycled material in packaging and a ban on packaging containing 
heavy metals. Furthermore, the Commission never endorsed the greenest 
amendment favoured by the Environment Committee—that environmentally 
progressive states be given considerable discretion to opt-up for more 
stringent national standards.
Council of Ministers
Changes to the structure of the EC policymaking process brought about 
by the SEA also allow predictions about the Council's role in the packaging 
directive. First, the SEA altered the dynamics of bargaining within the 
Council by increasing the use of qualified majority voting. With the formal 
demise of the national veto one would expect that environmental directives 
would contain targets and standards significantly above the prevailing lowest 
common denominator. Although it is debatable which institutions and 
pressures were primarily responsible for the conception and adoption of the 
SEA, there is general agreement that Article 100A expedited completion of 
the common market and unblocked a substantial number of directives which 
had previously languished under the constraints of the Luxembourg 
Compromise (Moravcsik 1991, Garrett 1992, Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). 
And it was the bargaining dynamics inherent to the Luxembourg Compromise 
which often prevented Community environmental standards from surpassing 
the lowest common denominator (Weiler 1991, Golub 1994a, 1994b, 
Rehbinder and Stewart 1985, Haigh 1992).
In fact, development of the packaging directive confirms the fears 




























































































majority voting would remove their veto and allow European environmental 
standards to be dragged down to the lowest common denominator.19 I would 
suggest that the lowest common denominator obtains when a directive requires 
no member state to introduce significant changes in order to upgrade their 
environmental practices. For the purposes of the present discussion, the 
lowest common denominator consists of combining information from Table 1 
and Table 2, each of which provides a view of prevailing conditions in the 
various member states.
At first it appears from Table 2 that under the terms of the directive 
many states would be forced to introduce strict recycling laws. However, 
comparing the requirements set out in the directive with the recycling levels 
already achieved in the member states (Table 1), which in many cases do not 
reflect advances already made since 1987, one finds that only Irish paper, 
Belgian aluminium and Portuguese aluminium present any problems 
whatsoever. Table 2 shows that recycling of Belgian aluminium was already 
scheduled to increase regardless of the directive. Furthermore, Portugal and 
Ireland were given until 2005 to meet the required recycling and recovery 
targets. Thus in almost all cases the directive actually approximated recycling 
rates which already existed or were already planned throughout the 
Community. In the remaining few instances it allowed substantial derogations 
which postponed any required changes to state practice. Thus there is little 
evidence that "the grubbier majority will under the directive have to come up 
with plans to do much more," and considerable evidence that the directive 
represented the lowest common denominator (Economist, 18 December 1993).
The only provision which might have posed problems for the member 
states and thus represented a move beyond the lowest common denominator 
was the target for plastic, a material whose recycling involves higher cost and
19As discussed below, in this case the opt-out provisions provided by Article 100A(4) of the 




























































































more advanced technology. Calculating the rate of plastic recycling raises a 
number of definitional problems and is further complicated by a general lack 
of hard data. But even in this area, close inspection of existing and planned 
plastic recycling in the member states suggests that the directive is little more 
than a lowest common denominator. As of 1993, France, Italy, and the UK 
already recycled 17-31% of their plastic packaging material, with plans to 
significantly increase these rates by 2000.20 Germany, Belgium, Denmark, 
and the Netherlands had recycling plans which far surpassed the targets 
established by the directive. Each of the remaining five states had plans to 
increase overall plastic recycling and had already started to recover specific 
items such as bottles for plastic drinks. Ireland, Portugal and Greece 
particularly benefited from the 10 year deadline.
The fact that the directive basically reflected the lowest common 
denominator highlights that even with the structural changes brought about by 
the SEA, power ultimately lies with the national representatives in the Council 
of Ministers—more precisely, with a qualified majority of these ministers. 
Although the Council adopted an enormous number of amendments put 
forward by the Parliament and Commission, which would indicate that the 
power of agenda-setting resided in these latter institutions, these amendments 
primarily affected cosmetic changes to the packaging proposal. Even with 
clear formal powers to set the agenda and control the content of directives, the 
Commission and Parliament were unable to dictate stringent environmental 
standards in the packaging directive because, in the end, their objectives were 
unpalatable to a qualified majority of member states. Of course things would 
have been totally different if the commission or parliament had exercised their 
formal powers and dictated the content of the proposal put before the Council
20These rates combine mechanical as well as chemical recycling, and are also based on a 




























































































for decision. In this case, the fact is that they did not, or could not, because it 
would have produced unappealing consequences.
The lowest common denominator result also demonstrates the potential 
for some states, in this case particularly Germany, to lose under qualified 
majority voting. Instead of uniform and stringent targets favoured by the 
Commission, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, a QMV saw fit to 
establish easily met targets which the minority coalition was forbidden from 
exceeding except under strict conditions of national recycling self-sufficiency. 
By emphasising national self-sufficiency in waste recycling, as well as the 
importance of each state being able to meet the agreed targets, the directive 
provides Britain, France and other states legal grounds on which to block such 
exports. As mentioned at the start of this paper, prior to the directive the ECJ 
would probably have considered such restrictions discriminations on trade and 
therefore contrary to Article 30. It should be noted that even after 
harmonisation Germany and the other member states which lost the QMV 
could still opt-up for more stringent domestic recycling standards under 
Article 100A(4), but in doing they would not regain political options which 
the directive curtailed because they could not force other states to accept 
unwanted waste shipments.
5. Refining Integration Theory
What does this study of the packaging directive tell us about the current 
debate on the nature of integration? It clarifies the competing claims of those 
who defend state-centric models and those who characterise integration as an 
accumulation of supranational powers or a diffusion of power towards multi­
level government, and it suggests a method by which these claims may be 
reconciled or refuted. Multi-level government models posit that power has 
moved away from national executives and away from the Council as a plethora 




























































































process. State-centric models posit instead that the Council has retained a 
monopoly on real power and that other EC institutions play either a limited or 
subservient role in the policymaking process.
The packaging case suggests that either of these theories taken alone 
lacks explanatory power. It suggests further that the dominant theories do not 
directly confront one another but are in fact talking about different aspects of 
integration. The diffusion model is not comprehensive because it conflates 
influence with power. It is undeniable that the accessibility of the Commission 
and EP allows mobilisation; there is ample evidence that direct dialogue takes 
place between these two institutions and NGOs, regions, local government, 
individuals, single firms and the separate governments. The packaging and 
recycling industries as well as Greenpeace and other environmental 
organisations obviously affected how members of the Commission and of the 
EP worded the original proposal and its amendments.
Unfortunately, the diffusion literature often equates influence at draft 
and pre-draft stages with having power over final decisions. This study 
suggests that the true test of whether power has been diffused is whether or 
not one can point to legislation which was amended and then adopted in the 
face of member state opposition or to proposed legislation which was blocked 
by the Commission or EP despite Council support.21 Unless either of these 
two instances can be demonstrated, then the most one can say is that the 
dialogue produced by the participation of multiple actors yields ideas which 
are in turn used as resources by the Council. As Marks correctly points out, 
on issues that are not highly polarised among member states, supranational
21Due to space constraints, this study focuses on shifting legislative power and will not 
address the role of soft law or the ECJ in undermining national autonomy, nor instances where 
the Commission or Parliament can take direct administrative or legislative action which 
impinges on national prerogatives without involving the Council. It is fully recognised that 
some theorists might consider these equally if not more important measures of diffusion 




























































































actors and epistemic communities can influence the content and direction of 
policy through skilful persuasion.
This is indeed one form of agenda setting and involvement, but, as 
Marks and others concede, it does not undermine the power of states (instead, 
the persuasion of analytical arguments replaces the exercise of power) (Marks, 
Hooghe and Blank 1994:22). If anything it supports those who claim that the 
variety of actors serves merely a functional role—a reservoir of creative ideas 
which are sometimes embraced by the Council to advance the agendas of the 
member states. To this extent, involvement and influence differ markedly 
from power. In terms of institutional influence, Parliament and the 
Commission can provide a repertoire of policy options. But in terms of 
power they can not prescribe specific policy outcomes. The ability to get 
people thinking about certain ideas constitutes an important but weak form of 
agenda setting which does not threaten state centric models. It has been 
argued, for example, that the Commission played just such a role in the 
development of the Single European Act (Dehousse and Majone 1994). The 
crucial point is that when Commission and EP ideas are not embraced by the 
Council, the mobilisation of actors produces no tangible results and no 
influence whatsoever, short of preventing Council action and thereby 
paralysing the entire legislative process.
But as the packaging example illustrates, state centric models are of 
equally limited value because they overestimate the ability of the Council to 
dominate the other institutions, and because they conflate collective Council 
authority with the preservation of national sovereignty and national autonomy. 
The first of these limitations becomes clear if we apply the previously 
mentioned two-pronged test of where power actually lies to the existing 
empirical evidence. It is difficult to reconcile the expanded formal powers of 
the EP with the suggestion that the Council retains total control of the 




























































































to the field of environmental policy it is possible to identify several cases 
where the EP altered or defeated the Council's common position. In the 
packaging case, the Environment Committee of the Parliament was powerless 
to dictate anything to the Council, but if the requisite number of votes had 
been forthcoming in the Parliament the clear power of that institution would 
have become apparent. This illustrates an important clarification to the 
ongoing theoretical debate: when the involvement of multiple actors produces 
ideas which the Commission and EP then force into the final directive through 
amendments, diffusion of power away from the Council is undeniable. Of 
course the onus is on diffusion theorists to demonstrate that their studies 
identify a shift of power and not merely contributing factors which influenced 
the Council to vote in a certain way (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989, Hooghe and 
Keating 1994, Hooghe and Marks 1995).
It becomes clear at this point that the competing theories are actually 
speaking in different languages. Whereas state-centric models focus 
exclusively on power, diffusion models focus on influence. Thus Marks sets 
out to show that "supranational institutions...have independent influence in 
policy making that cannot be derived from their role as agents of state 
executives," while Moravcsik devotes his analysis to assessing the expanded 
prerogative of national executives (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1994:8). In 
cases other than the two scenarios of shifting power mentioned above, these 
approaches are actually complementary—by generating ideas and policy 
proposals which the member states might not otherwise have thought of, the 
Commission, EP and NGOs demonstrate considerable influence over the 
integration process without exercising actual power over individual decisions. 
Supranational organisations are not inherently subservient to the will of the 
member states, but it would be equally simplistic to claim that the technical 
expertise, organisational capacity or range of policy options available to the 




























































































of each piece EC directive (Majone, 1994; Marks, Hooghe and Blank 
1994:26). Models such as the one presented by Moravcsik could subsume 
much of the diffusion evidence by recognising this distinction and conceding 
the influence but not the power of bodies other than the Council.
The second weakness of state-centric models is that by focusing 
exclusively on inter-institutional relations and the collective power of national 
executives in Council, they obscure the fact that some individual national 
executives inevitably become "losers" under QMV. Having lost the fight, 
these unfortunate states are faced with binding European legislation which 
curtails their own choice of policies, thus eroding their individual national 
autonomy and national sovereignty. Short of pulling out of the EC, individual 
national executives have no choice but to live with what they regard as 
unnecessary or misdirected laws. The case of the packaging directive clarifies 
this point. By adopting a lowest common denominator approach, the directive 
made it impossible, in fact illegal, for Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands 
to pursue what they considered perfectly reasonable environmental objectives- 
-meeting stringent environmental standards by whatever means possible, 
including the export of large quantities of packaging waste. There is no 
evidence that these three states were in any way compensated with side 
payments or concessions in other policy areas, nor that their national 
governments actually desired laxer standards and secretly welcomed defeat at 
Community level in a manner similar to the "slack cutting" found in the 
Belgian privatisation or the Italian monetary discipline (Milward 1992, 1993, 
Moravcsik 1994). The lesson is clear: for many directives there will always 
be at least one loser. Some states will either be forced to adopt expensive and 
presumably unpopular new policies, or to forego more stringent standards 
preferred by their own citizens.
Thus Moravcsik's claim that "where chief executives have divergent 




























































































dynamics (Moravcsik, 1994:58). A more accurate rule would hold that where 
executives have divergent goals, those who find themselves on the losing end 
of a QMV always forfeit the ability to pursue their domestic agendas free 
from Community constraints, and are sometimes forced to pursue the 
majority's agenda using policy instruments chosen by the majority. It should 
also be recalled that if the EP had secured 22 more votes during its second 
reading and been able to muster a QMV in Council, the situations might easily 
have been reversed, with environmentally progressive states ending up the 
winners and a different minority coalition facing unpleasant but nevertheless 
binding European targets. In either case, these situations—and as will be 
discussed below there may be literally tens of thousands—reveal quite 
dramatically that national executives do not "bolster their control over 
domestic agenda-setting by cartelizing international policy initiation" 
(Moravcsik, 1994:11).
The third shortcoming of state-centric models is that they ignore the 
effects of mutually beneficial collective action by Council on the residual 
autonomy available to the member states. Even assuming that the Council 
produces laws which on the whole satisfy each of the member states, 
obligations undertaken at the EC level place considerable restrictions on the 
autonomy and flexibility of each individual country. Even the lowest common 
denominator limits the options of the less developed countries by preventing 
backsliding, setting compliance deadlines and recycling targets which 
otherwise might have been repealed or amended by the national executive. 
Thus the current national executive who negotiated the EC law faces a 
restricted range of policy options at the national level. In the case of the 
packaging directive, by being forced to actually carry out existing national 
recycling plans, EC law clearly restricted the autonomy of the British, French, 
Italian and Belgian governments. This loss of national executive autonomy 




























































































bound by EC obligations entered into by previous administrations. In the 
current case, a new government in any of the previously listed states will have 
to comply with mandatory EC recycling targets with which they may or may 
not agree.
It is therefore not only diffusion to other institutions which erodes 
sovereignty but the diffusion from individual state executives to the collective 
will of the Council. Moravcsik admits that states lose "external sovereignty" 
but he wrongly equates "cutting slack" with enhancing the overall 
manoeuvrability of national executives. In fact, by fostering wider and deeper 
integration, national executives cut themselves slack at the price of painting 
themselves into a comer—they gain the luxury of legislating free from 
domestic constraints, but exercise this freedom in an ever diminishing policy 
space. Confined by a burgeoning body of EC law, this steadily shrinking 
policy space is inherited by each successive national administration.
It is for this reason that Moravcsik's assertion that "EC policies tend, on 
balance, to reinforce the domestic power of national executives" appears so 
unconvincing (Moravcsik 1994:52). For it is not the five examples of 
intergovernmental bargaining over high politics, which he like Milward 
before him defend quite convincingly, which are "broadly representative" of 
EC institutions and policies, but examples like the packaging waste proposal 
and the 24,120 EC regulations and directives which were in force by the end 
of 1992 which constitute the real test of whether or not "international 
institutions undermine domestic sovereignty" (Moravcsik, 1994:64). This 
question can only be answered by considering the full effect of EC law on 
national autonomy. Although a daunting task, the persuasiveness of state­
centric models would be greatly enhanced if they could show that this huge 
body of EC law, which in some cases is scheduled to account for over 80% of 
national legislation by the turn of the century, did not restrict the policy 




























































































Nor can examples such as the packaging waste directive be easily 
dismissed as unrepresentative by claiming that "few governments have any 
preexisting [environmental] policies" which might conflict with EC actions 
(Moravcsik 1994:53). Besides being factually incorrect, this claim is also 
irrelevant; even if there had been little national environmental law on the 
books, at one point or another most member states have adamantly resisted EC 
environmental proposals because they would have entailed enormous costs. 
Intense disagreements between the Commission and Council, and within the 
Council itself almost always led to watered down directives and lowest 
common denominator legislation. Nevertheless, since 1967 the corpus of EC 
law has steadily expanded, with a corresponding constriction of national 
autonomy.
It is for this reason that the ambiguous concept of "pooled sovereignty", 
which conflates preservation of national legislative autonomy with the 
attainment of national objectives, has been used so effectively to take the sting 
out of European integration (Keohane and Hoffmann 1990, Milward 1992, 
1993, Golub 1994a). Pooled sovereignty implies that states sacrifice 
sovereignty in order to attain national political goals which can better be met 
through Community legislation. National security and trade liberalisation are 
the two examples usually cited. As realists proponents of state-centric models 
point out, for each state membership in the Community must be positive sum 
game on aggregate, or at least prove less costly than secession. But even if 
pooled sovereignty enables states to attain their desired goals, they must accept 
a restriction on their legislative discretion and thus a curtailment of executive 
autonomy which authors such as Moravcsik fail to recognise.
6. Conclusion
This study has traced the development of the packaging waste proposal 




























































































identify central features of the integration process. The premise of the 
analysis was that structural changes introduced by the SEA and reinforced by 
the TEU eroded the authority of the Council and formally empowered the 
Commission and the European Parliament. This shift of power should have 
been apparent in the Commission’s and Parliament's ability to set the agenda 
and exercise substantial control over the eventual provisions of the directive. 
Moreover, the reputation of these two institutions as considerably "greener" 
than the Council should have led to stringent environmental standards well 
above the prevailing lowest common denominator.
However, an examination of the protracted negotiations and a 
comparison of the original proposal with the final directive reveals no 
evidence of a weakened Council or of the supposed agenda-setting powers of 
the other major institutions. The final directive contained none of the 
controversial provisions originally favoured by the Commission and supported 
by the Parliament, reflecting instead the lowest common denominator of waste 
recovery and recycling rates in the member states. In securing the adoption of 
its common position, the Council met with little effective resistance from the 
Commission or Parliament. The Commission abandoned the contentious 
aspects of its proposal early on in the negotiating process, and failed to 
support their réintroduction during Parliament's two readings. Besides 
revealing the limits of partnership between Commission and Parliament, the 
study also discovered a further level of complexity surrounding the role of the 
latter; the ineffectiveness of the second reading stemmed from the fact that 
the Parliament as a whole refused to adopt the amendments put forward by its 
remarkably determined Environment Committee.
Although the study focused on the packaging waste directive, lessons 
from this one example help clarify central issues in the two competing 
conceptions of European integration. The role of the various actors 




























































































between influence and power, a distinction which is often lost in discussions of 
integration. Until advocates of diffusion and state dominance acknowledge the 
implications which flow from this distinction they will continue to speak at 
cross purposes instead of directly addressing points of contention.
It is suggested that state centric models could subsume much of the 
diffusion literature by conceding the influence but not the power of the 
Commission and Parliament in the decisionmaking process. As the packaging 
case demonstrates, all the technical expertise, agenda-setting and influence of 
the Commission and Parliament came to nothing, unless these two institutions 
have the determination to risk paralysing the decisionmaking process, because 
ultimately power resides with the Council; with a qualified majority in 
Council, to be more precise.
This suggests that instead of documenting instances where mobilisation 
and dialogue between an expanding array of actors merely influenced eventual 
Council decisions, diffusion theorists could sharpen their criticisms of state 
dominance by focusing instead on cases where action was taken or prevented 
despite Council opposition. State-centric models are particularly susceptible to 
such criticism because they overlook the expansion of the Parliament's formal 
powers and how this may lead to amendment or paralysis of Council decisions. 
Additionally, state-centric models overlook the impact which EC legislation 
such as the packaging directive, produced through qualified majority voting, 
has on the residual ability of national executives to control domestic political 
agendas when it imposes policy objectives and instmments.
Finally, by narrowing their attention to power rather than influence, 
diffusion theorists can capitalise on what is perhaps the most blatant omission 
of state-centric models: the failure to recognise that the enormous body of 
binding EC laws, even if it "cuts slack" for national executives and fosters the 




























































































executives with more and more control over less and less, until they achieve
absolute control over nothing at all.
References
Arp, Henning (1992) "The European Parliament in European Community Environmental 
Policy," EUI Working Paper EPU No. 92/13 (Florence.European University Institute).
Club de Bruxelles (1994) Business and European Environmental Policies (Brussels:Club de 
Bruxelles).
Dehousse, R. and G. Majone (1994) "The Institutional Dynamics of European Integration: 
From the Single Act to the Maastricht Treaty," in Stephen Martin, The Construction of 
Europe (Dordrecht.Kluwer).
Eamshaw, D. and D. Judge (1993) "The European Parliament and the Sweeteners Directive: 
From Footnote to Inter-Institutional Conflict,” 31 Journal o f Common Market Studies 103.
European Parliament (1993) Report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Protection, Doc A3-0174/93, 8 June 1993.
European Parliament (1994a) Report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Protection, Document A3-0237/94, 11 April 1994.
Garrett, G. (1992) "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The EC’s Internal 
Market," 46 International Organization 533 (1992).
Golub, J. (1994a) British Integration into the EEC: A Case Study in European Environmental 
Policy (Oxford University doctoral thesis, 1994).
Golub, J. (1994b) "The Pivotal Role of British Sovereignty in EC Environmental Policy," EUI 
Working Paper RSC No. 94/17 (Florence:European University Institute).
Haigh, N. (1992) EEC Environmental Policy and Britain (London:Longman).
Hooghe, L. and M. Keating (1994) "The Politics of EU Regional Policy," 1 Journal o f 
European Public Policy 367 (1994).
Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (1995) "Channels of Subnational Representation in the European 
Union," (mimeo).
House of Lords (1993) Select Committee on the European Communities, 26th Report (1992- 
93).
Jacobs, F., R. Corbett and M. Shackleton (1992) The European Parliament (Essex:Longman).
Judge, D. (1993) ’"Predestined to Save the Earth': The Environment Committee of the 
European Parliament," in David Judge ed., A Green Dimension fo r  the European 
Community: Political Issues and Processes (London:Frank Cass).
Judge, D. and D. Eamshaw (1994) "Weak European Parliament Influence? A Study of the 




























































































Keohane, R. and S. Hoffmann (1990) "Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional 
Change," in William Wallace, ed., The Dynamics o f European Integration (LondomPinter).
Kramer, L. (1993) "Environmental Protection and Article 30 EEC Treaty," 30 Common 
Market Law Review 111.
Majone, G. (1994) "The European Community as a Regulatory State" (mimeo).
Marks, G. L. Hooghe and K. Blank (1994) "European Integration and the State," presented at 
APSA meeting, New York, 1-4 September, 1994.
Milward, A. (1992) The European Rescue o f the Nation-State (London:Routledge).
Milward, A. et al. eds. (1993) The Frontier o f National Sovereignty (London: Routledge).
Moravcsik, A. (1991) "Negotiating the Single European Act," National Interests and 
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," 45 International Organization 19.
Moravcsik, A. (1994) "Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic 
Politics and International Cooperation," Harvard Centre for European Studies, Working 
Paper Series #52.
Newman, O. and A. Foster (1993) European Environmental Statistics Handbook (Gale 
Research International Ltd.).
Nugent, N. (1991) The Government and Politics o f the European Community (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan).
Peters, G. (1994) "Agenda-setting in the European Community," 1 Journal o f European Public 
Policy 9.
Rehbinder, E. and R. Stewart (1985) Environmental Protection Policy (Berlin:de Gruyter).
Sandholtz, W. and J. Zysman (1989) "1992: Recasting the European Bargain," 42 World 
Politics 95.
Sexton, T. (1991) "Enacting National Environmental Laws More Stringent than Other States' 
Laws in the European Community," 24 Cornell International Law Review 563.
UNECE (1993) Management o f plastic Wastes in the ECE Region (New York:United Nations 
Publications).
UNEP (1991) United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental Data Report 1991.
UNEP (1992) United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental Data Report 1992.
UNEP (1994) United Nations Environment Programme, 17 Industry and the Environment 
(April-June 1994).
van Goethem, A. (1993) Packaging Waste The Regulatory Framework in the Twelve EU 
Member States (Brussels:Europe Information Service).
von Wilmowsky, P. (1993) "Waste Disposal in the Internal Market: The State of Play After the 
ECJ's Ruling in the Walloon Import Ban,” 30 Common Market Law Review 541.
Wallace, H., W. Wallace and C. Webb eds. (1983) Policy-Making in the European 
Community (ChicestenWiley).































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 




□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1996/97





































































































Working Papers of the
RSC No. 94/1
Fritz W. SCHARPF
Community and Autonomy Multilevel
Policy-Making in the European Union *
RSC No. 94/2
Paul McALEAVEY
The Political Logic of the European
Community Structural Funds Budget:




Japanese Public Policy for Cooperative
Supply of Credit Guarantee to Small Firms -




European Integration Between Political 
Science and International Relations Theory: 
The End of Sovereignty *
RSC No. 94/5
Stcfaan DE RYNCK
The Europeanization of Regional
Development Policies in the Flemish Region
RSC No. 94/6
Enrique ALBEROLAILA 
Convergence Bands: A Proposal to Reform 




The EC and the New United Nations
RSC No. 94/8 
Sidney TARROW
Social Movements in Europe: Movement 
Society or Europeanization of Conflict?
RSC No. 94/9
Vojin DIMITRUEVIC
The 1974 Consutution as a Factor in the









Privatization in Disintegrating East European 
States: The Case of Former Yugoslavia
RSC No. 94/12 
Alberto CHILOSI
Property and Management Privatization in 
Eastern European Transition: Economic 




Integration Theory, Subsidiarity and the 
Internationalisation of Issues: The 
Implications for Legitimacy *
RSC No. 94/14
Simon JOHNSON/Heidi KROLL 
Complementarities, Managers and Mass 
Privatization Programs after Communism
RSC No. 94/15 
Renzo DAVIDDI
Privatization in the Transition to a Market 
Economy
RSC No. 94/16 
Alberto BACCINI
Industrial Organizadon and the Financing of 
Small Firms: The Case of MagneTek
RSC No. 94/17 
Jonathan GOLUB
The Pivotal Role of British Sovereignty in 
EC Environmental Policy
RSC No. 94/18
Peter Viggo JAKOBSEN 
Multilateralism Matters but How?
The Impact of Muldlateralism on Great 





























































































R S C  N o . 9 4 /1 9
Andrea BOSCO
A ‘Federator’ for Europe: Altiero Spinelli 
and the Constituent Role of the European 
Parliament
R S C  N o . 9 4 /2 0
Johnny LAURSEN
Blueprints of Nordic Integration. Dynamics 
and Institutions in Nordic Cooperation, 
1945-72
y.-, . 'i '.  y.--
' t '  ' I '
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Mutual Trust, Credible Commitments and 
the Evolution of Rules for a Single 
European Market
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2  
Ute COLLIER
Electricity Privatisation and Environmental 
Policy in the UK: Some Lessons for the 
Rest of Europe
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3  
Giuliana GEMELLI 
American Influence on European 
Management Education: The Role of the 
Ford Foundation
R S C  N o . 9 5 /4
Renaud DEHOUSSE 
Institutional Reform in the European 
Community: Are there Alternatives to the 
Majoritarian Avenue?
R S C  N o . 9 5 /5
Vivien A. SCHMIDT
The New World Order, Incorporated:
The Rise of Business and the Decline of the 
Nation-State
R S C  N o . 9 5 /6
Liesbet HOOGHE
Subnational Mobilisation in the European 
Union
R S C  N o . 9 5 /7
Gary MARKS/Liesbet HOOGHE/Kermit 
BLANK
European Integration and the State
R S C  N o . 9 5 /8
Sonia LUCARELLI
The International Community and the
Yugoslav Crisis: A Chronology of Events *
R S C  N o . 9 5 /9
A Constitution for the European Union? 
Proceedings of a Conference, 12-13 May 1994, 
Organized by the Robert Schuman Centre with the 
Patronage of the European Parliament
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 0  
Martin RHODES
‘Subversive Liberalism’: Market Integration, 
Globalisation and the European Welfare 
Suite v
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 1
Joseph H.H. WEILER/ Ulrich HALTERN/ 
Franz MAYER
European Democracy and its Critique - 
Five Uneasy Pieces *
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 2
Richard ROSE/Christian HAERPFER 
Democracy and Enlarging the European 
Union Eastward
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 3  
Donatella DELLA PORTA 
Social Movements and the Suite: Thoughts 
on the Policing of Protest
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 4
Patrick A. MC CARTHY/Aris 
ALEXOPOULOS
Theory Synthesis in IR - Problems & 
Possibilities
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 5
Denise R. OSBORN 
Crime and the UK Economy
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 6
Jérôme HENRY/Jens WEIDMANN 
The French-German Interest Rate 
Differential since German Unification:
The Impact of the 1992-1993 EMS Crises
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 7
Giorgia GIOVANNETTl/Ramon 
MARIMON





























































































R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 8
Bernhard WINKLER
Towards a Strategic View on EMU -
A Critical Survey
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 9
Joseph H.H. WEILER 
The State “iiber ailes”
Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht 
Decision
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 0  
Mare E. SMYRL
From Regional Policy Communities to 
European Networks: Inter-regional 
Divergence in the Implementation of EC 
Regional Policy in France
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 1  
Claus-Dieter EHLERMANN 
Increased Differentiation or Stronger 
Uniformity
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 2
Emile NOËL
La conférence intergouvemementale de 1996 
Vers un nouvel ordre institutionnel
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 3  
Jo SHAW
European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? 
Towards a New Dynamic
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 4  
Hervé BRIBOSIA
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Belgium
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 5  
Juliane KOKOTT
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Germany
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 6
Monica CLAES/Bruno DE WITTE 
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on the Netherlands
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 7
Karen ALTER
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context
Explaining National Court Acceptance o f 
European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Evaluation o f Theories o f Legal Integration
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 8  
Jens PLÔTNER
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on France
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 9  
P.P. CRAIG
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on the United Kingdom
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 0
Francesco P. RUGGERI LADERCHI 
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Italy
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 1  
Henri ETIENNE
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Luxembourg
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 2
Philippe A. WEBER-PANARIELLO 
The Integration of Matters of Justice and 
Home Affairs into Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union: A Step Towards more 
Democracy?
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 3  
Debra MAT1ER
Data, Information, Evidence and Rhetoric in 
the Environmental Policy Process:
The Case of Solid Waste Management
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 4  
Michael J. ARTIS





























































































R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 5
Christopher TAYLOR
Exchange Rate Arrangements for a Multi-
Speed Europe
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 6  
Iver B. NEUMANN 
Collective Identity Formation: Self and 
Other in International Relations
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 7  
Sonia LUCARELLI
The European Response to the Yugoslav 
Crisis: Story of a Two-Level Constraint
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 8
Alec STONE SWEET
Constitutional Dialogues in the European
Community
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 9  
Thomas GEHRING 
Integrating Integration Theory: 
Neofunctionalism and International Regimes
R S C  N o . 9 5 /4 0
David COBHAM
The UK’s Search for a Monetary Policy:
In and Out of the ERM
' 4 '
R S C  N o . 9 6 /1  
Ute COLUER
Implementing a Climate Change Strategy in 
the European Union: Obstacles and 
Opportunities
R S C  N o . 9 6 /2  
Jonathan GOLUB 
Sovereignty and Subsidiarity in EU 
Environmental Policy
R S C  N o . 9 6 /3  
Jonathan GOLUB
State Power and Institutional Influence in 
European Integration: Lessons from the 
Packaging Waste Directive
*out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
